Peace at What Price?: Leader Culpability and the Domestic Politics of War Termination
Why do some leaders stay in wars they are unlikely to win? Why do other leaders give in to their adversaries' demands when continued fighting is still possible? Peace at What Price? strives to answer these questions by offering a new theoretical concept: leader culpability. Culpable leaders - those who can be credibly linked to the decision to involve the state in the war - face a significantly higher likelihood of domestic punishment if they fail to win a war than non-culpable leaders who do the same. Consequently, culpable leaders will prosecute wars very differently from their non-culpable counterparts. Utilizing a large-N analysis and case illustrations, the book's findings challenge the conventional wisdom regarding the relationship between war outcomes and leader removal and demonstrate the necessity of looking at individual leader attributes, instead of collapsing leaders by regime type. The book also offers new insights on democracies at war and speaks to the American experience in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Function by being one of my primary comrades in the “first book” trenches. Though we study very different things, I knew his door was always open when I needed to vent my frustrations or celebrate finishing a chapter. Ben helped in innumerable ways: answering endless Stata questions, reading version after version of troublesome sections, and serving as both a friend and sounding board ever since I arrived at Maryland. Another equally important group in the long list of people to whom I owe a debt.
Punish the leader if he was culpable for involving the state in the conflict. 41 Baker (2013). 42 Posner (2013: emphasis mine). 43 Bissegger (2013). 44 The usual “ceteris paribus” disclaimer applies. Conditions may exist where citizens may want to stay in costly wars (e.g., if the adversary is intent on annexing a part of the state). I explore this possibility in later chapters. 39 A Theory of Leader Culpability Table 2.1. Possible Wartime Scenarios: State Performance and Leader.
Doing so, increase their risk of punishment if the country fares poorly in the war. This potential for the reassignation of culpability exists because while citizens might expect a culpable leader to continue fighting until he wins, they should be more surprised if a nonculpable leader decides to stay in the war for a long period of time after taking power. Because the public knows the leader could end the war with minimal backlash, citizens will likely assume a nonculpable leader who stays in a.
Following text this is not the case. While some culpable legislators (especially supporters who are nonassociates) will see a potential value in switching to the antiwar camp, nonculpable leaders will still be the most likely of all the types to take concrete steps to end the war. After discussing why this is true for both associates and supporters in a general sense, I return to my discussion of Congress and the Iraq war to examine which type of legislator supported the antiwar legislation. As.
Issue.”58 Clinton agreed. She was opposed to the idea of needing to “apologize” for her earlier stance and knew that, “if she reversed herself now, she would be buying a one-way ticket to Kerryville: the GOP would tattoo her forehead with the lethal ‘flip-flopper’ label.”59 In the end, Obama’s persistence in highlighting their differences on the war forced her to tack left, but by this point it was too late. Antiwar Democrats across the country had made it clear that they saw Obama’s lack of.